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Recent Developments 
Piselli v. 75th St. Medical: 
The Limitations Period for Bringing a Medical Malpractice Claim Does Not 
Commence Running Against a Minor Until He Reaches the Age of Majority 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the 
limitations period for bringing a 
medical malpractice claim does not 
commence running against a minor's 
claim until he reaches the age of 
majority. Piselli v. 75th St. Med., 
371 Md. 188, 194,808 A.2d 508, 
511 (2002). Requiring otherwise, 
the court determined, would place 
an unreasonable restriction upon the 
remedies available to a child and a 
child's access to the courts in 
violation of Article 19 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights. Id. 
at 215,808 A.2d at 523-24. 
Christopher Piselli ("Chris-
topher") first complained of pain in 
his left hip inAugust 1993. His father 
promptly took him to 75 th St. 
Medical Center in Ocean City, 
Maryland where Dr. Lynn 
Yarborough examined him and 
determined that Christopher most 
likely pulled a hamstring muscle. 
Several days later, the injury was 
aggravated and Christopher was 
taken by ambulance to a hospital 
where it was found that Christopher 
had a fracture in his hip. 
After a period of attempted 
rehabilitation, Christopher suffered 
a series of complications starting in 
the fall of1993. Following surgery, 
doctors informed the family that 
Christopher had a permanent 
disability that would significantly 
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impair his ability to participate in 
certain activities and would require 
multiple surgeries. 
In July 1998, Christopher's 
parents filed a medical malpractice 
claim in the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Maryland, individually 
and on behalf of Christopher, against 
75th St. Medical Center and Dr. 
Yarborough. The jury acquitted Dr. 
Yarborough, but found that 75th St. 
Medical did not meet the requisite 
standard of care in treating Chris-
topher, and that this deviation 
proximately caused Christopher's 
injury. The jury further determined 
that Christopher's parents dis-
covered the injury to Christopher in 
November 1993, but Christopher 
did not discover the injury until 
1999. 
Following the jury's verdict, the 
district court ruled the action barred 
by the statute oflimitations pursuant 
to Section 5-109 ofthe Courts and 
Judicial Proceedings Article. The 
court determined that the statute of 
limitations commenced running in 
November 1993 when Christo-
pher's parents learned ofthe injury, 
and entered judgment for 75th St. 
Medical Center on that basis. The 
Piselli's appealed to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit, which certified the 
following question to the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland: "[W]hether, 
when a claim is brought by parents 
on behalf of a child who was injured 
before reaching age eleven, the 
three-year statute oflimitations of 
Section 5-109(a)(2) begins to 
accrue upon the discovery of the 
injury by the child or upon 
discovery of the injury by the 
parents." Id. at 193, 808 A.2d at 
510-11. 
The court of appeals recog-
nized this as an issue of first 
impression in the State, the 
resolution of which was dispositive 
of the case. Id. at 197-98, 808 
A.2d at 513. The action was filed 
within three years of the date 
Christopher discovered the injury, 
but more than three years after his 
parents' discovery. Id. Therefore, 
if the statute of limitations 
commenced from the time of 
Christopher's discovery of the 
injury, the jury's verdict would 
stand with regard to Christopher's 
claim, but if it began accruing from 
the time ofthe parent's discovery, 
the action was barred. Piselli, 371 
Md. at 197-98, 808 A.2d at 
513(2002)). 
The court reformulated the 
question certified by the U.S. court 
of appeals to consider whether the 
limitations periods prescribed by 
Section 5-109 for the claim of a 
minor are ''unreasonable restrictions 
upon a traditional remedy and the 
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minor's access to the courts and, 
therefore, are in violation of Article 
19 [of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights]." Id. at 207, 808 A.2d at 
519. Article 19 prohibits unrea-
sonable restrictions of remedies that 
are traditionally available to 
plaintiffs, and restrictions that limit 
a plaintiff's access to the courts. Id. 
at 207, 808 A.2d at 518. 
In light of the reformulated 
question, the court looked to 
relevant case law. In Garay v. 
Overholtzer, the court recognized 
that a parent's cause of action and 
a claim brought on behalf of a child 
are distinct and separate. Id. at 
209, 808A.2d at 520 (citing Garay 
v. Overholtzer, 332 Md. 339, 631 
A.2d 429 (1993)). In Johns 
Hopkins Hasp. v. Pepper, the court 
applied its decision in Garay to a 
medical malpractice claim brought 
on behalf of an infant child, holding 
that the doctrine of necessaries 
protects a minor's right to recover 
medical expenses that his parents 
cannot afford to pay and for which 
the child may ultimately be liable. Id 
at 210-11,808 A.2d at 522 (citing 
Johns Hopkins Hasp., 346 Md. 
679,697 A.2d 1358 (1997)). The 
court further noted the well-
established principle in the State of 
Maryland that the statute of 
limitations typically does not begin 
running against a child until the child 
reaches the age ofmajority. Id. at 
212, 808 A.2d at 522. 
In consideration of these 
factors, the court determined that 
permitting the limitations period 
prescribed by Section 5-109 to 
begin accruing from the time of a 
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minor's injury would place "an 
unreasonable restriction upon a 
child's remedy and the child's 
access to the courts" pursuant to 
Article 19 of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights. Piselli, 371 
Md. at 215, 808 A.2d at 524 
(2002). If allowed, the child's 
separate cause of action would be 
dependent upon his parents filing an 
action in a timely manner. Id. As a 
child is not able to bring a tort action 
on his own behalf until reaching the 
age of eighteen, the limitations 
period for the child's claim should 
not begin running until the child 
reaches that age. Id. at 215-16, 
808 A.2d at 524. 
The court of appeals held that 
the statue oflimitations for a child's 
medical malpractice claim, as 
prescribed by Section 5-109 ofthe 
Courts and Judicial Proceedings 
Article, begins running when the 
child reaches the age of majority. In 
so holding, the court opens a door 
previously closed to children injured 
as minors whose claims were not 
filed in a timely manner by their 
parents. 
In a climate already strained 
by the constantly rising costs of 
medical malpractice premiums, due 
in large part to exorbitant jury 
awards, this decision is likely to 
exacerbate the problem by 
dramatically increasing the number 
of potential plaintiffs. This decision 
reflects the court's conviction that 
the rights of children must be 
protected and should not be limited 
by the vigilance of their parents. 
Accordingly, a child's right to bring 
suit for tortious injuries suffered 
during childhood is, in this decision, 
extended to an age in which the child 
is capable of making decisions in his 
own best interest. 
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